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NOTE 
“Exclusively” Confusing: Who Has 
Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction Under 
the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law? 
Cooper v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 361 S.W.3d 60 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) 
N. DREW KEMP* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Missouri Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) was originally de-
signed as a bargain between employers and employees by creating a no-fault, 
exclusive administrative remedy and by making sure more employees re-
ceived compensation for their on-the-job injuries.
1
  The Act also reduced 
litigation and transaction costs for employers, thereby lowering the cost of 
doing business.
2
  In general, if an injury falls under the definitions set forth 
under chapter 287 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, then the Labor and In-
dustrial Relations Commission (Commission) has exclusive jurisdiction over 
the matter.
3
   
The Commission is the administrative body that oversees workers’ 
compensation claims and it has the power to enact all regulations necessary 
for the efficient management and operation of the workers’ compensation 
system.
4
  In the typical case, when a workplace injury occurs, the employee 
must notify the employer and the Commission by filling out a “Report of 
Injury” within thirty days from the injury date.
5
  If the employer and employ-
  
 * University of Missouri, B.S. 2010, J.D. 2013; Associate Member, Missouri 
Law Review, 2012-13.  I would like to thank Dean Gely for his terrific suggestions 
and help with the editing process.  I would also like to thank my family and friends 
for their support in this lengthy endeavor of becoming a lawyer. 
 1. See generally Amanda Yoder, Note, Resurrection of a Dead Remedy: Bring-
ing Common Law Negligence Back into Employment Law, 75 MO. L. REV. 1093, 
1100 (2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. MO. REV. STAT. § 286.005.3 (2000 & Supp. 2012).  The term “exclusive” is 
derived from the language of the statute which gives the employer immunity from “all 
other liability whatsoever, whether to the employee or any other person.” § 287.120.1. 
 4. Seeley v. Anchor Fence Co., 96 S.W.3d 809, 815 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002), 
overruled by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003). 
 5. § 287.420; Injury Reporting Responsibilities, MO. DEP’T LAB. & INDUS. REL., 
http://labor.mo.gov/DWC/Employers/report_respon.asp (last visited Sep. 4, 2013). 
1
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ee dispute whether the employer is liable under the Act, then the parties may 
request mediation,
6
 or the employee may file a claim for compensation, 
which initiates a contested claim.
7
  The Commission will assign an adminis-
trative law judge to hear the parties’ case and determine whether the injury 
falls within the scope of the Act and the employer’s liability, if any.
8
 
It is clear now that if a work injury is not within the scope of the Act, 
employees have a right to bring a common law action against their employer 
just as they could before workers’ compensation was adopted.
9
  In such a 
civil case, the employer may object by raising the exclusive remedy defense, 
which the Supreme Court of Missouri has held will be waived unless it is 
timely brought as an affirmative defense.
10
  Because the circuit courts and the 
Commission are mutually exclusive in the eyes of an injured employee seek-
ing compensation, a determination must be made as to which venue has juris-
diction over his injury.   
In 2011, the Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals summa-
rized and clarified the issue of which court has jurisdiction to determine juris-
diction.  After Cooper v. Chrysler Group, LLC, it is clear that a Missouri 
circuit court must yield to the Commission when the jurisdiction-determining 
issue is one of fact.
11
  However, a circuit court can nevertheless review juris-
dictional issues of law.  An important question remains, however: will a cir-
cuit court distinguish between issues of fact and issues of law if an affirma-
tive defense is not timely raised by the employer? 
This distinction between jurisdictional issues of fact and issues of law is 
important because failing to distinguish the two may result in inefficiency and 
unfairness.
12
  Additionally, understanding the procedural jurisprudence re-
garding these types of parallel cases
13
 is becoming increasingly necessary.  
For nearly eighty years, the Act was interpreted broadly to cover most injured 
workers.  However, the 2005 amendments to chapter 287 significantly limited 
its scope,
14




 6. MO. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 50-2.010(4) (2013). 
 7. § 50-2.010(7)(A). 
 8. See § 50-2.010. 
 9. Mo. Alliance for Retired Ams. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Relations, 277 
S.W.3d 670, 684-85 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 10. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 298 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Mo. 2009)   
(en banc). 
 11. 361 S.W.3d 60, 63 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011).  Issues of fact are under the prima-
ry jurisdiction of the Commission.  Id. at 63-64. 
 12. See discussion infra notes 137-155 and accompanying text. 
 13. That is, cases in which an injured employee seeks relief in the workers’ com-
pensation system and tries to sue his employer in circuit court because he is uncertain 
as to which has jurisdiction.  
 14. See, e.g., Johme v. St. John’s Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504, 513 (Mo. 
2012) (en banc); Miller v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 287 S.W.3d 671, 673 
(Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
2
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As a result, employees who normally would seek refuge under the Act may 
be surprised when they are kicked out.
16
  Similarly, employees seeking dam-
ages from their employers in circuit courts may be told that their claims be-
long with the Commission.
17
  This has forced injured employees to seek rem-




II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
On March 2, 2007, while working as an assembly worker at a Chrysler 
plant in Fenton, Missouri, Kevin Cooper was injured when he slipped and fell 
near his workstation.
19
  Just seven days later, he filed a Claim for Compensa-
tion with the Commission for injuries to his lower back and body as a 
whole.
20
  As the parties contested liability under the Act, four years went by 
  
 15. Specifically, courts have been inconsistent in interpreting and applying the 
definition of “accident,” which is defined as “an unexpected traumatic event or    
unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the    
time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work 
shift.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.2 (2000 & Supp. 2012); see, e.g., Kristen Norman, 
Injury No. 06-00182, 2007 WL 2353272 (Mo. Lab. Ind. Rel. Com. July 3, 2007) 
(holding that bending one’s knee to place a shoe cover on one’s shoe was not an  
“unusual strain or traumatic event” because employer required the shoe cover); cf. 
Jason Gamet, Injury No. 06-064607, 2007 WL 4055934 (Mo. Lab. Ind. Rel. Com. 
Nov. 13, 2007) (holding that employee’s act of bending over to pick up a pallet was 
an unusual strain). 
 16. See, e.g., Miller, 287 S.W.3d at 674 (holding that the injury was not compen-
sable under the Missouri Workers’ Compensation law because there was no causal 
connection between the work activity and the injury). 
 17. See, e.g., State ex rel. Tri-Cnty. Elec. Coop. Ass’n v. Dial, 192 S.W.3d 708, 
712 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (holding that the Commission had exclusive juris-        
diction over the claims against Tri-County resulting from the workplace death of      
an employee). 
 18. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that the 2005 narrowing of the scope of the 
Workers’ Compensation law did not significantly reduce the number of injuries when 
compared to the number of claims.  See Missouri Division of Workers’ Compensa-
tion, 2010 Annual Report, February, 2011, at 10-14, available at http://www.labor. 
mo.gov/DWC/Forms/DWC2010AnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Annual Report] 
(reporting that First Reports of Injury dropped by about 10 percent between the years 
2005 and 2006 whereas Claims for Compensation fell by 15 percent in the same peri-
od).  This might suggest that many injured employees are seeking relief in other  
venues.  Id. 
 19. Cooper v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 361 S.W.3d 60, 62 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). 
 20. Id.  “Body as a whole” is a technical term referring to the number of “weeks” 
that should be awarded under the Act.  § 287.190.  Specifically, the Act sets out a 
schedule of losses, which assigns different parts of the body a number representing 
the number of weeks as a measure of loss.  In the typical case, the loss of the “great” 
toe on either foot is assigned 40 weeks.  Id.  The loss of the little finger at the distal 
 
3
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without Cooper receiving any compensation from his employer.
21
  According 
to Cooper’s counsel, Chrysler Group LLC’s (Chrysler) managers had been 
warned that a machine near Cooper’s workstation was leaking oil onto the 
floor and that someone might get injured.
22
  While his workers’ compensation 
claim was pending and with no resolution in sight, on January 11, 2010, 
Cooper filed a petition in the St. Louis County Circuit Court, Division Two, 
alleging that his employer’s negligence caused his injuries.
23
 
As amended, Cooper’s petition sought “damages on the same set of facts 
and for the same injury as that alleged in his workers’ compensation claim.”
24
  
Chrysler filed a timely answer to Cooper’s petition, asserting the affirmative 
defense of exclusivity.
25
  Cooper responded to Chrysler’s defense by arguing 
that workers’ compensation was not the exclusive remedy because the fall 
was not the “prevailing factor”
26
 in causing his injuries, and the fall itself was 
not an “accident”
27
 as defined under the Act.
28
  The trial court entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of Chrysler and Cooper appealed.
29
 
The Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals first concluded 
that the trial court’s consideration of “whether summary judgment [was] the 
proper remedy at this stage of the proceeding merit[ed] plain error review.”
30
  
The court then found that the primary jurisdiction doctrine provided that is-
sues of law could be determined by the circuit courts themselves but that 
questions of fact were solely within the jurisdiction of the Commission.
31
  
Finally, the court determined that because the issues in the case – namely, 
whether Cooper suffered an “accident” and whether his surgery was neces-
sary – were questions of fact, the Commission had sole authority to determine 
  
joint is assigned 16 weeks.  Id.  The loss of an arm: 232 weeks, and so on.  Id.  Some 
vital body parts, which are not enumerated in section 287.190, are assigned the max-
imum number of weeks, or 400.  Id.  Injury to the “body as a whole” or “BAW” is 
given such treatment.  Id. 
 21. Appellant’s Brief, Cooper, 361 S.W.3d 60 (No. ED96549), 2011 WL 
3467625, at *6. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Cooper, 361 S.W.3d at 62. 
 25. Id.; see also McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 298 S.W.3d 473, 476 
(Mo. 2009) (en banc) (holding that the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Com-
pensation law must be raised as an affirmative defense to the court’s statutory authori-
ty to proceed with resolving the claim). 
 26. Cooper, 361 S.W.3d at 62.  The “prevailing factor” is defined to be “the 
primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical con-
dition and disability.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.3(1) (2000 & Supp. 2012). 
 27. § 287.020.3(2)(a). 
 28. Cooper, 361 S.W.3d at 62. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 64. 
 31. Id. 
4
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whether Cooper could sue under a negligence theory or had to rely on work-
ers’ compensation.
32
   The court concluded that granting summary judgment 
and leaving Cooper without any remedy (in the event the Commission deter-
mined that the Act did not apply) would result in manifest injustice.
33
  Thus, 
the court held that when the applicability of the Act is at issue, questions of 
fact shall be exclusively determined by the Commission, and any civil pro-
ceeding will be stayed until such issues are resolved. 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Act was created to remedy the harsh effects of inadequate recover-
ies for injured employees under traditional common law tort actions.
34
  In 
1921, prior to the enactment of the Act, it was estimated that about 25,000 
employees were killed or injured each year in Missouri due to work-related 
accidents.
35
  However, eighty percent of those injured were not compensated 
at all, and the other twenty percent who received compensation “had to bear 
the expense and delay of litigation.”
36
  As a result, on November 2, 1926, 
Missouri became the forty-third state to adopt a worker’s compensation pro-
gram.
37
  By adopting the law, employers gave up their fault-based defenses 
under the common law in exchange for immunity from tort liability from 
injured workers.
38
  Injured workers gave up their common law right to sue 
their employers for negligence in exchange for more certain, but limited, 
compensation benefits.
39
  Specifically, injured workers
40
 may be entitled to 
medical treatment,
41




 and permanent 
  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 66. 
 34. Todd v. Goostree, 493 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Mo. App. K.C.D. 1973) superseded 
by statute, Missouri Employers Mutual Insurance Company Act, S.B. 251, 87th Gen. 
Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1993). 
 35. Id. at 416 n.2. 
 36. Id. 
 37. JEFFREY A. BURNS, Workers’ Compensation, in 2A MO. PRAC.,METHODS OF 
PRAC.: LITIGATION GUIDE § 27.1 (4th ed. 2013); MCANANY, VAN CLEAVE & 
PHILLIPS, P.A., THE CONTINUED EROSION OF THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY DOCTRINE 1 
(2011), available at http://www.mvplaw.com/post/news/Exclusive% 20Remedy.pdf. 
 38. See Todd, 493 S.W.2d at 416; see also Yoder, supra note 1, at 1100. 
 39. See Todd, 493 S.W.2d at 416; see also Yoder, supra note 1, at 1100. 
 40. “Injury” is defined under the Workers’ Compensation law as “an injury 
which has arisen out of and in the course of employment.” MO. REV. STAT. § 
287.020.3(1) (Supp. 2012). 
 41. § 287.140. 
 42. Conrad v. Jack Cooper Transp. Co., 273 S.W.3d 49, 51 (Mo. App. W.D. 
2008) (discussing the inclusion of future medical expenses with the compensation 
available under section 287.140). 
 43. § 287.170. 
5
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disability.
44
  Close family members of those who are killed on the job may be 
entitled to death benefits
45
 and funeral expenses.
46
 
The original version of the Act required that “[a]ll of the provisions of 
this act shall be liberally construed with a view toward the public welfare.”
47
  
Early interpretation of this “liberal construction” provision required that 
where a question of jurisdiction was in doubt, it should be held in favor of the 
Commission.
48
  Section 287.120, which sets out the scope of the Act, only 
applies to accidental injuries and has remained unchanged since its enact-
ment.  It states: 
 
Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be lia-
ble, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the pro-
visions of this chapter for personal injury or death of an employee by 
accident arising out of and in the course of the employee’s employ-
ment . . . [and] shall be released from all other liability whatsoever, 




As such, the law was deemed the exclusive remedy for injured workers. 
 
A. The Revolving Door to Circuit Court 
 
The years following the adoption of the Act proved to be somewhat of a 
rollercoaster.  The scope of the Act was narrowed, then expanded, and then 
narrowed again.  Under the original Act, the legislature defined an “accident” 
as “an unexpected or unforeseen identifiable event or series of events.”
50
  In 
interpreting this definition, the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled that an “ac-
cident” only occurred when the worker’s injury was accompanied by a slip or 
a fall or when the strain was unexpected or abnormal.
51
  Thus, if an employee 
was injured as a result of the performance of ordinary job duties, compensa-
tion was not permitted.   
Eventually, plaintiffs succeeded in opening the door, albeit slightly, to 
the civil courtrooms.  In Hines v. Continental Baking Co., the Missouri West-
  
 44. § 287.190. 
 45. § 287.230. 
 46. § 287.240. 
 47. MO. REV. STAT. § 3764 (1939) (amended by MO. REV. STAT. § 287.800 
(2000)); see also Sargent v. Clements, 88 S.W.2d 174, 178 (Mo. 1935). 
 48. Ringeisen v. Insulation Servs., Inc., 539 S.W.2d 621, 625-26 (Mo. App. E.D. 
1976) (citing Hughes v. Md. Cas. Co., 76 S.W.2d 1101, 1105 (Mo. App.            
K.C.D. 1934)). 
 49. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120.1 (2000 & Supp. 2012). 
 50. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.2 (2000) amended by S.B. 1 & 130, 93d Gen. 
Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005). 
 51. See State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes, 153 S.W.2d 40, 42    
(Mo. 1941). 
6
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ern District Court of Appeals held that a worker who sustained certain work 
injuries not covered by workers’ compensation could nevertheless bring a 
personal injury claim against her employer in circuit court.
52
  In Hines, the 
plaintiff worked on an assembly line at a bread company.
53
  Her job included 
removing loaves of bread from a conveyor belt, placing them on a rack, and 
moving the rack once it became full.
54
  The plaintiff injured her back while 
pushing the rack to another location and subsequently filed a claim for work-
er’s compensation.
55
  After losing her claim on appeal to the Commission,
56
 
she filed a tort action, alleging that her employer negligently failed to proper-
ly maintain the metal rollers on the bottom of the racks and that this caused 
her injuries.
57
  The employer, who prevailed by claiming that the plaintiff did 
not suffer an “accident” as defined under the Act,
58
 was estopped from assert-
ing as an exclusivity defense that an “accident” did occur.
59
  Thus, the court 
allowed the civil action to proceed, since the applicability of the Act was 
excluded.
60
  In 1968, the Supreme Court of Missouri confirmed this holding 
in Harryman v. L. & N. Buick-Pontiac, Inc.
61
   
By 1973, the legislature expanded the scope of the law by requiring 
mandatory participation for most employers.
62
  In 1983, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri provided a much broader definition of “accident” to include “any 
job-related” injury.
63
  As a result, more claims became compensable under 
the Act, and the number of circuit court filings from injured employees de-
clined.
64
  In 2001, the total number of Claims for Compensation filed in Mis-
souri was approximately 25,000.
65
   
  
 52. 334 S.W.2d 140, 145-46 (Mo. App. K.C.D. 1960). 
 53. Id. at 141-42. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 142. 
 56. In the typical case, an injured employee may have the administrative law 
judge’s decision reviewed by the Commission, who has the authority to change the 
award.  MO. REV. STAT. § 287.470 (2000).  The injured employee also has the right to 
appeal the decision of the Commission to the appropriate circuit court.  § 287.490.  
After review by the appropriate circuit court, a claimant may appeal to the Missouri 
Court of Appeals.  Id. 
 57. Hines, 334 S.W.2d at 143. 
 58. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51. 
 59. Hines, 334 S.W.2d at 144. 
 60. Id. 
 61. 431 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Mo. 1968) (en banc). 
 62. See MO. REV. STAT. § 287.030 (2000). 
 63. Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Serv., Inc., 646 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Mo. 1983) 
(en banc). 
 64. MCANANY, VAN CLEAVE & PHILLIPS, P.A., supra note 37, at 2. 
 65. 2010 Annual Report, supra note 18, at 14. 
7
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In 2005, the legislature passed several amendments to the Act that sig-
nificantly narrowed its scope.
66
  The amendments, which apply to injuries 
occurring after August 28, 2005, require work to be “the prevailing factor,” 
rather than “a substantial factor,”
67
 in causing the injury.
68
  Therefore, the 
injured employee has a higher burden of proving that there were no other 
contributing non-employment factors.  Another major change was the addi-
tion of the requirement that the accident be “identifiable by time and place of 
occurrence.”
69
  This language had the effect of excluding injuries caused by 
repetitive actions or motions over time.  Finally, and perhaps most notably, 
the amendment to Section 287.800.1 requires that all of the provisions within 
the Act be “strictly construed.”
70
 
In 2009, the Supreme Court of Missouri considered a constitutional 
challenge to these amendments.  In Missouri Alliance for Retired Americans 
v. Department of Labor & Industrial Relations (M.A.R.A.), the plaintiffs’ 
labor organization challenged the constitutionality of the 2005 amendments
71
 
and sought declaratory judgment as to the rights of injured workers whose 
accidents were no longer within the scope of the Act.
72
  The court determined 
that if an injury comes within the definition of the term “accident,” then it is 
included within the exclusivity provisions of the Act, and recovery can be 
had, if at all, only under the terms of the Act.
73
  If the injury is one that is not 
included within the term “accident,” the employee is not subject to the exclu-
sivity provisions of the Act.
74
  The court held that such employees were nev-
ertheless entitled to pursue recovery under common law negligence, just as 
they had done before the adoption of the Act.
75
   
  
 66. S.B. 1 & 130, 93d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005). 
 67. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.1 (Supp. 2012). 
 68. See Adele Nicholas, Workers Comp Decision a Mixed Bag for Employers, 
INSIDE COUNSEL (May 1, 2009), available at 2009 WLNR 21858569, and 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2009/05/01/workers-comp-decision-a-mixed-bag-for-
employers?t=circuit-updates. 
 69. § 287.020.2.  
 70. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.800 (2000) (amended 2008). 
 71. 277 S.W.3d 670, 675 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) [hereinafter M.A.R.A.] (The chal-
lenge was based on allegations that the amendments to the Act limited injured em-
ployees’ rights to access the courts in violation of Due Process.). 
 72. Id. at 674. 
 73. Id. at 679. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 674, 680.  As noted before, the exclusive remedy provision distin-
guishes between injuries by accident, and injuries by occupational disease.              
See MO REV. STAT.  § 287.020.3(5) (Supp. 2011) (Injury “shall in no case except as 
specifically provided in this chapter be construed to include occupational disease in 
any form . . . .”).  In State ex rel. KCP & L Greater Missouri Operations Co. v. Cook, 
the court issued a decision that further limited the reach of the exclusivity provision.  
353 S.W.3d 14 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011).  In that case, the plaintiff first filed suit in 
circuit court alleging injuries from exposure to asbestos due to his employer’s negli-
 
8
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Thus, a line was drawn, and two mutually exclusive avenues were 
opened for injured employees seeking relief from their employers.  However, 
because the amendments are relatively new, administrative law judges have 
been unable to consistently apply the ambiguous definitions of “accident” and 
“injury.”
76
  This uncertainty has led injured employees to seek relief in both 
venues.
77
  As a result, it is now the responsibility of the employers to raise the 
exclusive remedy defense.
78
  The timing with which an employer may raise 
this defense has become yet another issue.  
B. Exclusivity Becomes an Affirmative Defense 
The Act’s exclusivity provision gives jurisdiction over workers’ com-
pensation cases to the Commission.
79
  However, Missouri’s constitution is 
unequivocal in stating that circuit courts have “original jurisdiction over all 
cases and matters, civil and criminal.”
80
  Under principles of preemption, no 
statute can rob a circuit court of its ability to hear a particular case over which 
it has original jurisdiction.
81
  When a statute gives a specific tribunal exclu-
sive authority to hear certain types of cases, a circuit court’s authority to act 
can only be objected to as an affirmative defense.
82
   
Nevertheless, beginning in 1982, Missouri courts, in interpreting the ex-
clusivity provision, consistently held that the circuit courts lacked jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of workers’ compensation claims.
83
  Because circuit 
  
gence.  Id. at 16-17.  The employer asserted that the plaintiff was injured in the scope 
and course of employment and subsequently filed a motion to dismiss based on the    
exclusive remedy provision.  Id. at 17.  The court responded by holding that “[t]he 
only statutory provision which arguably bars [the plaintiff] from proceeding against 
KCP & L in the circuit court . . . is § 287.120.”  Id. at 18.  However, the court con-
cluded that “§ 287.120 only denies [the plaintiff] a common-law remedy for personal 
injury or death by accident.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, the 
court concluded that the exclusive remedy provision of the Act did not apply to occu-
pational disease claims and thus the Plaintiff could bring suit under common law.  Id. 
at 19-20. 
 76. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Cooper v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 361 S.W.3d 60, 62 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) 
(In addition to filing a claim for compensation with the Comission, the plaintiff also 
filed a civil lawsuit against his employer.). 
 78. See McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 298 S.W.3d 473, 477 (Mo. 2009) 
(en banc). 
 79. Cooper, 361 S.W.3d at 63. 
 80. MO. CONST. art. V, § 14; McCracken 298 S.W.3d at 476-77. 
 81. See McCracken 298 S.W.3d at 476-77. 
 82. Kemper v. Gluck, 39 S.W.2d 330, 333-34 (Mo. 1931) (en banc). 
 83. See State ex rel. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Ryan, 745 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 
1988) (en banc) (holding that a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion is the proper method to raise the defense of workers’ compensation), overruled 
by McCracken, 298 S.W.3d 473; see also Jones v. Jay Truck Driver Training Ctr., 
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courts can only adjudicate issues over which they have subject matter juris-
diction, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction could be 
raised at any time.
84
  Thus, the employer could raise the exclusive remedy 
defense at any time during a civil case – including the day of the trial.
85
  This 
is precisely what happened in McCracken v. Walmart Stores East, LP.
86
   
McCracken, who delivered bread to Walmart under contract, was in-
jured when he was struck in the shoulder by a bread rack.
87
  He was success-
ful in obtaining workers’ compensation benefits.
88
  However, Mr. McCracken 
subsequently filed a civil action against Walmart, alleging that a Walmart 
employee negligently pushed the bread rack into his shoulder.
89
  It was not 
until the morning of trial that Walmart filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that Mr. McCracken was a statutory 
employee.
90
  McCracken disagreed, arguing the circuit court had subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to hear the claim.
91
  The Supreme Court of Missouri agreed 
and stated that “to the extent that some cases have held that a court has no 
jurisdiction to determine a matter over which it has subject matter and per-
sonal jurisdiction, those cases have confused the concept of a circuit court’s 
jurisdiction – a matter determined under Missouri’s constitution – with the 
separate issue of the circuit court’s statutory or common law authority to 
grant relief in a particular case.”
92
  
The court held that the exclusivity provision invoked the circuit court’s 
authority to act and not its subject matter jurisdiction.
93
  The court then noted 
that “nothing in the Act supports the conclusion that the determination of 
applicability of the Act was intended to divest circuit courts of subject matter 
jurisdiction over personal injury actions that implicate provisions of the 
Act.”
94
  In recognizing that, in all other instances, a court’s statutory authority 
to act is properly objected to by an affirmative defense, the court stated that 
  
709 S.W.2d 114, 115-16 (Mo. 1986) (en banc), overruled by McCracken, 298 S.W.3d 
473; Shaver v. First Union Realty Mgmt., Inc., 713 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Mo. App. S.D. 
1986), abrogation recognized by McCracken, 298 S.W.3d 473; Parmer v. Bean, 636 
S.W.2d 691, 695 (Mo. App. E.D. 1982), overruled by McCracken, 298 S.W.3d 473. 
 84. See McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 477. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 476. 
 87. Id. at 475. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 476. 
 90. Id.  The Missouri statute provides that ‘‘[a]ny person who has work done 
under contract on or about his premises which is an operation of the usual business 
which he there carries on shall be deemed an employer and shall be fully liable under 
this chapter . . . .”  MO REV. STAT. § 287.040.1 (Supp. 2012). 
 91. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 476. 
 92. Id. at 477 (emphasis omitted). 
 93. Id. at 478-79. 
 94. Id. at 479. 
10
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“[t]o treat workers’ compensation defenses differently would promote contin-
ued confusion in the courts as to whether a court’s error in following a statute 
is jurisdictional in nature.”
95
  Therefore, the exclusivity provisions of the Act 
must be raised as an affirmative defense to a circuit court’s statutory authority 
to proceed, and that defense will be deemed waived if not asserted.
96
  The 
court ultimately concluded that Walmart was not Mr. McCracken’s statutory 
employer and reversed the trial court’s dismissal.
97
  
In this way, the procedural mechanisms for parallel suits were put in 
place.  When an employee, who has been hurt at work, brings a civil suit that 
is arguably subject to the Act, the employer can seek to get rid of the lawsuit 
by pleading the affirmative defense of exclusivity.
98
  If the court determines 
that the employee’s injury falls under the narrowly defined scope of the Act, 
the suit will be dismissed with prejudice, and the injured employee will have 
to seek relief under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission.
99
  If, how-
ever, the court determines that the employee does not fall within the realm of 
the Act, the court will deny the motion and adjudicate the civil case on the 
merits.
100
  Sometimes, however, the court will refuse to determine if the em-
ployee falls within the scope of the Act.
101
  This scenario makes it even more 
difficult for employers to get rid of these cases.  
  
 95. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 481. 
 98. The Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals slightly refined the 
McCracken decision in 2010.  See Fortenberry v. Buck, 307 S.W.3d 676 (Mo. App. 
W.D. 2010).  In Fortenberry, an employee at a Ford Motors manufacturing facility 
was injured at work and subsequently filed a claim for compensation.  Id. at 677.  
While his workers’ compensation claim was still pending, the employee filed a negli-
gence action against the Ford plant alleging that the on-staff doctor who treated him 
committed medical malpractice.  Id. at 678.  Following the decision in McCracken, 
the Ford plant promptly filed a motion to dismiss.  Id.  In applying the affirmative 
defense requirement, the court held that a defendant seeking a pretrial dismissal based 
on workers’ compensation exclusivity must file a motion for summary judgment.  Id. 
at 679.  The court mentioned in a footnote that “[w]hen the applicability of [workers’ 
compensation] appears from the face of the petition, a defendant can also properly file 
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” un-
der Missouri Supreme Court Rule 55.27(a)(6)] or a motion for judgment on the plead-
ing under Rule 55.27(b).  Id. at 679 n.2.  Thus, the employer must first determine if 
the jurisdictional issue appears on the face of the petition.  See id.  Missouri’s three 
appellate courts have subsequently issued opinions following these procedural guide-
lines.  See, e.g., Cooper v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 361 S.W.3d 60 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011); 
Heirien v. Flowers, 343 S.W.3d 699 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011); Treaster v. Betts, 324 
S.W.3d 487 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010). 
 99. See Cooper, 361 S.W.3d at 65. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See generally id. at 65-66. 
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C. Distinguishing Issues of Law from Issues of Fact  
Each case above involved issues of law.
102
  The difference between is-
sues of law and issues of fact has proved to be paramount in determining the 
correct mutually exclusive venue in which an injured worker must seek relief.  
In Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., the Supreme Court of Missouri addressed 
this issue.
103
  The employee, Killian, was an ironworker.
104
  When a frame-
work within which he was standing collapsed, he fell onto steel reinforcing 
rods and sustained severe injuries.
105
  Killian and his wife sued his employer 
in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, alleging that the employer’s in-
tentional acts caused the framework to collapse.
106
  The worker’s employer 
filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
circuit court.
107
  The circuit court sustained the employer’s motion to dismiss, 
and the appellate court reversed.
108
   
In affirming the circuit court’s judgment, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
held that because the issue was whether the employee’s injuries were the 
result of an accident or an intentional act, a question of fact, the Commission 
had primary jurisdiction.
109
  “Under the primary jurisdiction doctrine,” the 
court noted, “courts will not decide a controversy involving a question within 
the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal until after that tribunal has ren-
dered its decision.”
110
  The reasoning behind this distinction is that “where 
administrative knowledge and expertise are demanded,” such knowledge and 
expertise are necessary “to determine technical, intricate fact questions,” and 
“uniformity is important to the regulatory scheme.”
111
  Thus, only the Com-
mission shall hear the fact issues that determine whether a claim is subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Commission.  However, the issue remained as to what a 
  
 102. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d 473, discussed supra notes 84-97 (involving a ques-
tion of whether injured worker was a “statutory employee”); Fortenberry, 307 S.W.3d 
676, discussed supra note 98 (involving an issue of co-employee immunity); Heirien, 
343 S.W.3d 699, discussed supra note 98  (involved an issue of co-employee immuni-
ty); Treaster, 324 S.W.3d 487, discussed supra note 98 (involving an issue of co-
employee immunity). 
 103. 802 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). 
 104. Id. at 159. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 159.  It should be noted that this case was decided before McCracken, 
and even though Killian is not mentioned in the McCracken decision, McCracken 
held that “[t]o the extent that [previous] cases hold that the Act's applicability is a 
matter of the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, they are overruled.” McCracken, 
298 S.W.3d at 479. 
 108. Killian, 802 S.W.2d at 159. 
 109. Id. at 161. 
 110. Id. at 160. 
 111. Id. 
12
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circuit court should do if it determines that the Commission has primary ju-
risdiction over an issue of fact that is the subject of a motion to dismiss.  The 
circuit court could grant the motion to dismiss or deny the motion to dismiss 
and stay the proceeding until the Commission determines the applicability of 
the Act. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
Cooper alleged that, due to this fall, he suffered injuries to his back and 
body as a whole.
112
  Cooper subsequently filed a claim for compensation on 
March 9, 2007.
113
 Chrysler filed an answer to Cooper’s claim.  In its answer, 
Chrysler admitted that Cooper sustained a workplace injury and that Chrysler 
subsequently provided physical therapy to Cooper as treatment for the inju-
ries.
114
  Sometime during 2008, Cooper had surgery.
115
  In October 2009, 
counsel for Chrysler asserted that they disputed medical causation and that 
Cooper’s surgery was not necessitated by the fall.
116
  Chrysler later confirmed 
that it did not deny the accident, but rather challenged whether the 2008 sur-




While his workers’ compensation case was still pending, Cooper filed a 
civil lawsuit against Chrysler seeking damages on the same set of facts and 
for the same injury.
118
  Chrysler responded by raising the affirmative defense 
of exclusivity in its answer.
119
  Chrysler then filed a motion for summary 
judgment.
120
  Cooper “opposed the summary judgment motion on the ground 
that the Act was not the exclusive remedy because [his slip-and-fall] was not 
‘the prevailing factor’” and thus did not fall under the definition of an “acci-
dent” as required by the Act.
121




On appeal, Cooper relied on M.A.R.A. in asserting that because his      
injury was not within the new narrow definition of an “accident,” he had a 
  
 112. Cooper v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 361 S.W.3d 60, 62 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Respondent’s Brief, Cooper, 361 S.W.3d 60 (No. ED96549), 2011 WL 
3584285, at *7-8.  Section 287.140 requires employers to provide medical treatment 
that may “reasonably be required after the injury or disability, to cure and relieve 
from the effects of the injury.”  MO REV. STAT. § 287.140.1 (Supp. 2012). 
 118. Cooper, 361 S.W.3d at 62. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
13
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right to bring a civil action.
123
  The court first noted that the record cited by 
Cooper “does not support the assumptions that [Chrysler] ‘denied’ the claim 
or that . . . the slip and fall was not the ‘prevailing factor’” in causing his  
injury.
124
  Indeed, Chrysler relied on this assertion in its brief by arguing, 
inter alia, that Cooper admitted the applicability of the Act.
125
  However, the 
court determined that the plaintiff’s brief – challenging the defendant’s mo-
tion for summary judgment – was nonetheless enough to generate an issue of 
fact for the court.
126
   
The court recognized the holdings in M.A.R.A. and Killian and conclud-
ed that M.A.R.A. did not attempt to change the primary jurisdiction doctrine 
laid out in Killian.
127
  Thus, the court determined that Cooper had a right to 
file a common law action if he was excluded from the scope of the Act due to 
the nature of his injury.  The court also found that in this case, the applicabil-
ity of the Act was a question of fact to be determined by the Commission.
128
  
The court held that the trial court did not err in concluding the same.
129
  Final-
ly, the court noted that as Cooper failed to raise the issue of whether summary 
judgment was the proper remedy, it could only reverse and remand if the 
court found plain error under Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 84.13(c).
130
  
After applying the plain error review doctrine, the court stated that the proper 
remedy was to stay the proceeding in circuit court until the pending workers’ 
compensation case yielded an answer to the factual issue.
131
  The court con-
cluded that granting summary judgment was clear error and resulted in “man-
ifest injustice” because Cooper would be prevented from subsequently bring-
ing his civil claim in the event that the Commission determined that his injury 
did not result from an “accident” under the Act.
132
   
V. COMMENT 
Section 287.120 sets out the exclusive remedy for injured employees 
under Missouri workers’ compensation law.
133
  However, this section only 
applies to accidental injuries and not occupational diseases.
134
  After the Act 
  
 123. Id. at 63. 
 124. Id. at 62. 
 125. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 117, at *6. 
 126. See Cooper, 361 S.W.3d at 63. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. at 64. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 66. 
 132. Id. 
 133. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120 (Supp. 2012). 
 134. State ex rel. KCP & L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d 14, 
19 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). 
14
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was significantly narrowed by the 2005 amendments, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri declared that individuals whose injuries do not fit within the scope 
of the Act may bring civil actions just as they had done before the Act was 
adopted.
135
  If a civil action is brought in the first place, a defendant may ob-
ject to the court’s authority to act under the exclusivity provision, but it must 
do so as an affirmative defense.
136
  The defendant may file a motion for 
summary judgment or a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim if the 
jurisdictional issue appears on the face of the petition.
137
  If this affirmative 
defense motion involves an issue of law, the circuit court will adjudicate it.
138
  
If, however, the defense involves an issue of fact, the circuit court must con-
clude that only the Commission shall decide the issue.
139
  Under these cir-
cumstances, as in Cooper, if a parallel workers’ compensation claim is al-
ready pending, the circuit court will stay the proceeding until the Commission 
determines the jurisdictional issue of fact.
140
 
Jurisdictional issues of fact are those factual issues that will determine 
whether the employee falls under the scope of the Act.
141
  Thus, employers 
may raise these defenses in order to avoid all liability under the Act.
142
  These 
issues include, but are not limited to, determinations of (i) whether an “acci-
dent” occurred,
143
 (ii) whether the injury from the work related accident was 
the prevailing factor in causing the resulting medical condition and disabil-
ity,
144
 (iii) whether the accident arose out of and in the course of employ-
ment,
145
 (iv) whether the injury resulted from idiopathic causes,
146
 and (v) 
whether the hazard or risk was one to which the worker would have been 
  
 135. M.A.R.A., 277 S.W.3d 670, 680. 
 136. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 298 S.W.3d 473, 479 (Mo. 2009)   
(en banc). 
 137. See Fortenberry v. Buck, 307 S.W.3d 676, 679 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010). 
 138. Cooper v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 361 S.W.3d 60, 65 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 66.  Categorically, in serious injury cases, the injured worker may pre-
fer not to pursue a workers’ compensation claim in the first place, but instead file only 
in circuit court and bring his case before a jury.  Following Cooper, issues of fact 
shall only be determined by the Commission because it holds the administrative ex-
pertise and knowledge to determine these issues accurately and efficiently.  Id. at 63-
64.  It remains unknown, however, whether, in this situation, a circuit court will order 
an injured plaintiff to file a claim for compensation if he has yet to do so. 
 141. See id. at 65-66. 
 142. See id. at 62. 
 143. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.2 (Supp. 2012). 
 144. § 287.020.3(1). 
 145. § 287.020.3(2); Harris v. Westin Mgmt. Co. E., 230 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo. 2007) 
(en banc). 
 146. § 287.020.3(3). 
15
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equally exposed to outside of normal non-employment life.
147
  If any of these 
issues are raised in a civil action in Missouri, the defense should timely raise 
an affirmative defense, and the circuit court should conclude that only the 
Commission may determine the issue.  
Exclusivity of workers’ compensation is not treated consistently among 
the states, however.  Courts vary in their positions on who has “jurisdiction to 
determine jurisdiction.”
148
 One approach is known as the “split-jurisdiction” 
approach.
149
  Under this approach the Commission will always hear issues of 
fact regardless of where the claim is first filed.
150
  This is the approach fol-
lowed in Cooper.
151





 also follow this rule but do not directly differentiate between issues of 
law and issues of fact.  The Oregon Supreme Court held that: 
[While it] is true that the Workers' Compensation Board (board) rou-
tinely addresses questions regarding the compensability of workplace 
injuries[,] . . . we see nothing regarding the board's statutory jurisdic-
tion or adjudicative responsibilities that makes the board, rather than a 
court, a preferable forum, in the primary jurisdiction sense, for the 
resolution of the issue [of law] presented here.
154
   
Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that a court may decide 
whether a defendant is the plaintiff’s employer (a question of law) but lacks 
the power to determine whether an injury occurred in the course of employ-
ment (question of fact).
155
 
A second approach puts the Commission and the circuit courts on equal 
grounds in that the first to secure jurisdiction over the controversy shall    
decide which jurisdiction applies.
156
  Under this approach, the first party to 
  
 147. § 287.020.3(2)(b); see Johme v. St. John’s Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 
504, 511-12 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 148. See generally Daniel Keating, Comment, Employee Injury Cases: Should 
Courts or Boards Decide Whether Workers’ Compensation Laws Apply?, 53 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 258 (1986) (examining “three approaches that courts have adopted for decid-
ing which tribunal has ‘jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction’ in potential workers’ 
compensation actions”). 
 149. Id. at 265. 
 150. See id. at 265-66. 
 151. Cooper v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 361 S.W.3d 60, 65-66 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). 
 152. See Panpat v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 49 P.3d 773, 776 (Or. 
2002) (en banc). 
 153. See Sewell v. Clearing Machine Corp., 347 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 1984) (per 
curiam). 
 154. Panpat, 49 P.3d at 776. 
 155. Sewell v. Clearing Machine Corp., 347 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Mich. 1984); see 
also Keating, supra note 148, at 266. 
 156. Keating, supra note 148 at 263.  Keating suggests that this is the majority 
approach among the states.  Id. 
16
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file can feel secure in their belief as to which tribunal will be deciding exclu-
sivity of workers’ compensation.  Here, issues of law are treated identical     




A final approach is known as the “substantial question approach.”
158
  
This narrow approach “requires a court to defer to the [administrative] board 
if there is a ‘substantial question’ as to whether a particular injury occurred in 
the course of employment.”
159
  This rule was adopted by New York.
160
  In 
O’Rourke v. Long, New York’s highest court held that “where the availability 
of workers’ compensation hinges upon the resolution of . . . mixed questions 
of fact and law, the plaintiff may not choose the courts as the forum for the 
resolution of such questions.”
161
   
The “split-jurisdiction,” or Missouri approach, may be superior to the 
latter two approaches because it avoids situations in which the circuit courts 
have to answer questions for which “administrative knowledge and expertise 
are demanded.”
162
  To be sure, a circuit court addressing a factual issue re-
garding the applicability of workers’ compensation would likely lead to role-
reversal.  This rule would put the burden on the defendant employer to prove, 
after timely raising the affirmative defense of exclusivity, that the plaintiff 
suffered an “accident” under the Act and that the plaintiff’s medical condition 
and resulting disability constitute an “injury” under the Act.  These factual 
assertions could lead to the employer having to establish by expert medical 
evidence that the work-related incident was the “prevailing factor” in causing 
the plaintiff’s current medical condition.  The plaintiff, on the other hand, 
would have to prove that, at the time of his injury, he was not working within 
the scope and course of his employment, or that pre-existing impairments, 
conditions, or illnesses were the primary causes of his injuries.   
Ultimately, the employer would have to make the injured employee’s 
case for benefits under the Act – in order to avoid civil liability – and the 
employee would assert the usual defenses available under the Act.  If the 
employer were to prevail, and if the circuit court dismissed the action with 
prejudice, a subsequent workers’ compensation hearing before the Commis-
sion could be awkward.  An assertion of collateral estoppel
163
 by the injured 
  
 157. Id. at 264 (citing Scott v. Ind. Acc. Comm’n, 293 P.2d 18 (Cal. 1956) (per 
curiam)); see VanWagoner v. Beverly Enters., 970 S.W.2d 810 (Ark. 1998). 
 158. Keating, supra note 148, at 266. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See O’Rourke v. Long, 359 N.E.2d 1347, 1354 (1976). 
 161. Id. at 1354; Keating, supra note 148, at 267. 
 162. See Cooper v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 361 S.W.3d 60, 63 (Mo. App. E.D. 
2011); see also Keating, supra note 148, at 265-66. 
 163. Certainly, in a workers’ compensation case, an employee could assert that, 
under common law, the employer is estopped from denying liability under the Act 
after a valid and final judgment, granted by a circuit court, dismisses the action on the 
grounds that the employer is exclusively liable under the Act.  See Boswell v. Ameri-
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worker would likely secure a victory.  The employer would have effectively 
proved his liability under the Act in an effort to disprove his liability in the 
civil action.  Having spent considerable resources proving its liability, the 
employer would have to settle for feeble arguments against the nature and 
extent of the injury, or something similar.   
Alternatively, questions of law may rightly be determined by a circuit 
court.  To be sure, a circuit court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment 
after finding that the injured plaintiff is actually a statutory employee
164
 of the 
defendant would not secure the employer’s inevitable doom in a subsequent 
workers’ compensation case.  The employer would still be able to assert that 
an “accident” did not occur, or that the injury was not the prevailing factor in 
causing the employee’s current medical condition.  Regardless of the reason-
ing that the Cooper Court articulated, the fact remains that contrary results 
would have been bizarre, and ultimately, the court probably got it right in that 
the circuit courts should let the Commission determine fact issues.  
While Cooper provided a proper solution to the “which jurisdiction 
should decide jurisdiction” problem,
165
 an important question remains unan-
swered.  A hypothetical scenario may best illustrate this remaining question.  
Assume a defendant fails to raise an affirmative defense in a civil action, but 
the circuit court is nonetheless presented with an issue “where administrative 
knowledge and expertise are demanded.”
166
  Following McCracken and 
Fortenberry, the defendant may only raise the issue of the workers’ compen-
sation exclusive remedy in a timely motion and otherwise waives this affirm-
ative defense.
167
  If timely filed, the circuit court will hear the jurisdictional 
issue only if it involves a question of law.
168
  It follows that if no affirmative 
defense is raised, or is raised in an untimely fashion, a circuit court will pre-
sumably adjudicate the matter notwithstanding the potential to run into factu-
al issues over which the Commission should have primary jurisdiction.  Thus 
the consequences that follow counsel’s failure to file an affirmative defense 
could resemble those discussed above.  Certainly a subsequent legal malprac-
tice claim is not the most efficient way to put all parties back into the posi-
tions that they were in before the lawyer’s mistake. 
It should be noted that some courts may be aware of this anomaly.  At 
least one court has been extremely reluctant to deny a motion to dismiss on 
  
can Ins. Co., 835 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992).  It should be noted, however, 
that an award pursuant to the workers’ compensation law has no res judicata effect 
upon issues of liability involved in a common law action based on the same occur-
rence.  See State ex rel. Transit Cas. Co. v. Holt, 411 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App. 1967). 
 164. The issue of whether or not the employer is a statutory employee is an issue 
of law.  See, e.g., McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 298 S.W.3d 473, 479 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc). 
 165. Cooper, 361 S.W.3d at 63. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See supra Part III.B. 
 168. Cooper, 361 S.W.3d at 65. 
18
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the grounds that counsel failed to raise the defense in a timely manner.  In In 
re Luby’s Cafeterias, Inc., the Court of Appeals of Texas refused to deny the 
employer’s motion to dismiss against the wishes of the employee.
169
  In that 
case, the employer waited until just before trial to file a motion to dismiss.
170
  
The court ruled that “the fact that [the employer] participated in discovery 
was of necessity to defend itself, not a waiver of all affirmative defenses.”
171
  
Additionally, pending cases are “grandfathered” in.  The McCracken Court 
held that a motion to dismiss filed the day before trial, as Walmart Stores did, 
is not a timely affirmative defense.
172
  However, the McCracken Court also 
went on to rule that the new requirement of a timely affirmative defense 
would not apply retroactively.
173
  Walmart Stores’ counsel was off the hook.  
Therefore, counsel in pending civil cases brought by an employee before 
October 27, 2009, could still raise a motion to dismiss notwithstanding the 
holding in McCracken. 
The potential for a circuit court to address a jurisdictional issue of      
fact still remains for the majority of cases, however.  When, for some reason, 
some counsel somewhere fails to file a timely motion to dismiss, the circuit 
court may end up addressing issues which Cooper rightly determined should 
be decided by the Commission.  One would expect a Supreme Court hold-  
ing addressing this discrepancy, but the high court has remained silent on   
the issue. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Until 1926, Missouri workers were forced to seek relief in civil court for 
injuries sustained at work.
174
  The burden of proof facing injured workers was 
much higher.  Under the common law, an employee had an action for negli-
gence only if their employer’s conduct fell below the “standard of care estab-
lished by law for the protection of others.”
175
  After the Missouri legislature 
passed the Workers’ Compensation Act, employees were able to claim bene-
fits by proving that they suffered a “personal injury . . . by accident arising 
out of and in the course of [their] employment.”
176
  Ultimately, the lower 
  
 169. 979 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App. 1998). 
 170. Id. at 815. 
 171. Id. at 817-18. 
 172. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 298 S.W.3d 473, 475, 479 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc). 
 173. Id. at 479. 
 174. Jeffrey A. Burns, Workers' Compensation – Philosophy and History, in 2A 
MO. PRAC., METHODS OF PRAC.: LITIGATION GUIDE § 27.1 (4th ed. 2013). 
 175. Harris v. Niehaus, 857 S.W.2d 222, 225 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965)). 
 176. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120.1 (Supp. 2011).  
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standard meant injured employees could be more confident in obtaining com-
pensation and could do so in a shorter period of time.  
The Act also stipulated that it is the exclusive remedy for injured em-
ployees.
177
  Thus, workers’ compensation and civil suits became mutually 
exclusive.  Injured employees can bring claims in both arenas;
178
 however, 
benefits are obtainable in only one or the other.
179
  Thus, employers facing 
civil suits can now use the Act as a defense.  The McCracken Court held that 
this exclusivity defense must be brought as an affirmative defense, or else it 
will be deemed waived.
180
 
Additionally, in Killian, the Supreme Court held that the Commission 
has primary jurisdiction over certain issues of fact and that, therefore, the 
circuit courts must yield to the Commission’s decision-making.
181
  In Cooper, 
the court displayed its willingness to stay a proceeding until the Commission 
determines an issue of fact.
182
  The Cooper Court got this right in that allow-
ing a circuit court to rule on jurisdiction-determining issues of fact will lead 
to some inefficient and unfair outcomes.  However, Cooper and McCracken 
are irreconcilable.  If an employer fails to raise the exclusivity defense, a cir-
cuit court will nevertheless hear these issues that the Cooper Court declared it 
shall not hear.  This conflict may be the result of tension between the courts 
following the legislature’s narrowing of the definition of “accident” and “in-
jury” while still maintaining the Act’s exclusiveness. 
  
 177. See id. 
 178. See Cooper v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 361 S.W.3d 60, 62 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) 
(In addition to filing a claim for compensation with the Commission, the plaintiff also 
filed a civil lawsuit against his employer.). 
 179. See § 287.120.1. 
 180. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 298 S.W.3d 473, 475, 479 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc). 
 181. Killian v. J. & J. Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). 
 182. Cooper, 361 S.W.3d at 67. 
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